





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP**SECRET**INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION18 September 1946

(Date)


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PAPER: CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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18 DEC 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Mobilization Plan:

Reference: Letter, Chief of Naval Intelligence, subject as above, file A3/005040, dated 3 December 1946

1. The policy of replacement and rotation of Regular Navy officers on duty with CIG as outlined in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of reference is concurred in, on the basis that replacement and rotation will be planned to avoid mass loss and to permit continuity of operations within CIG without reduction in efficiency.
2. Nominations requested in paragraph 6 of reference will be proposed as soon as determination of individual efficiency can be made in each case.
3. It will be at least six months before initial individual nominations requested by paragraphs 7 and 9 of reference can be determined. Initial recommendations for these groups will be made to reach your office by approximately 15 July 1947. Thereafter, additional nominations will be made as circumstances permit. If eight weeks' absence from duty for indoctrination is essential, a carefully phased program will be worked out in advance to insure against lowered efficiency due to absence of an excessive number of operating personnel at any one time.
4. Paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 of reference are concurred in.
5. In connection with paragraph 12 of reference, the determining factor in cases of personnel abroad will necessarily be security requirements. It is believed at this time that relatively few nominations for Navy rank or rates will be made from this category, and probably none prior to D-Day.
6. In connection with paragraph 13 of reference, the numbers of ranks and rates indicated in paragraph 6 of memorandum dated 11 October 1946, are estimated only. These numbers may be considerably affected by various factors, particularly the proportion of female personnel who may be employed by CIG, and future government policy covering the status of females in case of emergency or war. It will be at least several months before a reasonably final estimate can be arrived at.
7. As recommended in paragraph 14 of reference, further necessary contact in connection with this problem will be made with [REDACTED]

Central Records (2)  
Executive Registry  
Secretariat ☒  
Return to ICAPS  
"Stayback"  
Chrono  
[REDACTED]

Suspense (1 Apr 47)

HOYT S. VANDENBERG  
Lieutenant General, US  
Director of Central Intelligence

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19 September 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

Pursuant to a request by the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the enclosed paper is circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,  
Secretary.

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ENCLOSURE

WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Intelligence

THE PROBLEM

1. To insure that war plans of the War and Navy Departments include provision for the Central Intelligence Group.

FACTS AND DISCUSSION

2. The Navy Department is now engaged in the preparation of war plans which include plans for the mobilization of personnel. It is presumed that the War Department is similarly engaged. So far as is known no such plans are being prepared by the Central Intelligence Group. The war plans of the War and Navy Departments should take note of the regular and reserve officers assigned mobilization billets in the Central Intelligence Group and should include everyforeseeable requirement regarding the procuring and training of Army and Navy personnel.

CONCLUSION

3. It is concluded that the War and Navy Departments should be informed regarding the personnel requirements of the Central Intelligence Group for full mobilization or war as follows:

- a. The military personnel to be retained by C.I.G.
- b. Planned expansion, if any, that requires assignment of additional regular personnel or the procurement and training of reserve personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 4. a. That the Central Intelligence Group make a study of their requirements for full mobilization of war.

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b. That such study include the personnel requirements of the Central Intelligence Group from the War and Navy Departments as follows:

- (1) Regular officers to be retained by C.I.G.
- (2) Regular officers to be assigned to C.I.G. (in addition to (1) above).
- (3) Reserve officers to be retained by C.I.G.
- (4) Reserve officers to be assigned to C.I.G. (in addition to (3) above).
- (5) Training requirements for (4) above.
- (6) Retired officers to be retained by C.I.G.
- (7) Retired officers to be assigned to C.I.G. (in addition to (6) above).
- (8) Training requirements for (7) above.
- (9) Enlisted personnel requirements, including training for same.

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BRIEF ON [REDACTED]

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WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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Admiral Inglis has recommended in [REDACTED] that the Central Intelligence Group make a study of its requirements for mobilization and that such a study include military personnel requirements of the Central Intelligence Group from the War and Navy Departments.

As a general principle, I firmly believe that the personnel requirements of the Central Intelligence Group should be as fully mobilized in peace as in war. On that basis, therefore, I propose to furnish the War and Navy Departments an estimate of C.I.G. personnel requirements based on present planning and taking into account the probable number of Reserve officers assigned to C.I.G.

I think it should be clear, however, that at our present stage of organization, any such estimates should be considered tentative and subject to substantial revision as the organization develops.

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## DISPOSITION FORM

FROM	TO	DATE	17 September 1946	FROM	TO	DATE
			DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE			CHIEF, CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF
			DEPUTY DIRECTOR, C.I.G.			W. Europe-Africa Branch
			ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR			E. Europe-USSR Branch
X			SECRETARY, N.I.A.			Middle East-India Branch
						Far East-Pacific Branch
			CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL SERVICES			Western Hemisphere Branch
X			Acting Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating & Planning Staff			
			CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF			ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
			Policy & Review Branch			Personnel Branch
			Information Branch			Budget & Fiscal Branch
			Intelligence Branch			Administrative Services Branch
			Security Branch			Central Records
			Support Branch			Security Branch

## REFERENCES:

ENCLOSURES: Memo dated 6 Sept. '46 from Chief Naval Intelligence to D of CI re "War Plans for CIG" and Paper prepared by ONI on same attached.

\_\_\_\_\_ ACTION \_\_\_\_\_ DIRECT REPLY  
 \_\_\_\_\_ RECOMMENDATION \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENT  
 \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ FILE  
 \_\_\_\_\_ INFORMATION \_\_\_\_\_ NOTE  
 \_\_\_\_\_ RETURN \_\_\_\_\_ MAIL  
 \_\_\_\_\_ PREPARATION OF REPLY

## REMARKS:

1. The organization of CIG is just beginning to reach a tentative final form. It's personnel requirements will be unsettled for several months due to:
- Current lack of knowledge of eventual responsibility for certain specific tasks.
  - Lack of determination at this time as to centralized operational requirements in various fields.
  - Insufficient operational experience on which to base reasonably firm personnel needs.

2. The nature of this type of an activity precludes initial determination of requirements for various types of purely armed services individuals. A considerable portion of both directive and subordinate positions can undoubtedly be filled by well qualified civilians. Whether a portion or all of such civilians would be required to be absorbed into the armed services in any future national emergency cannot at this time be determined.

3. This problem should be postponed for at least six months, after which we can give it more intelligent study. 25X1A

DONALD EDGAR

(Continue "Remarks" on back, if necessary) Acting Chief, Interdepartmental  
Coordinating & Planning Staff

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19 September 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

WAR PLANS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Memorandum by the Secretary

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JAMES S. LAY, JR.,  
Secretary.

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Secretary, N.I.A.

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